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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
Inmate Trevor Ringgold appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of 
corrections officers he sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for use of excessive force. The 
altercation in question began when Corrections Officer Matthew Keller allegedly called 
Ringgold out of the cafeteria line and assaulted him without provocation. (Keller later 
pled guilty to a state criminal assault charge and was fired.) In addition to suing Keller, 
Ringgold contends defendants Corrections Officers William Zosky and Tim Mari, as well 
as Sgt. Clayton Stoner, Lt. Jacob Wright, and Superintendent Brian Coleman, are liable 
for use of excessive force on theories of personal involvement or supervisory liability. All 
defendants save Keller moved for summary judgment, and the court relied on footage 
from the cafeteria’s security camera to conclude that “[n]o rational trier of fact could . . . 
find that [Zosky, Mari, or Stoner] used excessive force under the circumstances.” 
Ringgold v. Keller, 2014 WL 1317604, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2014). Nor, the court 
concluded, could supervisory liability attach to Stoner or Wright because Zosky and 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Mari, their subordinates, did not use excessive force. The court also concluded that 
Coleman was not liable. Ringgold appeals.1  
We believe the court properly granted summary judgment as to Coleman. We can 
find no evidence from which a jury could infer that Keller’s attack on Ringgold resulted 
from Coleman’s failure to implement certain staffing or monitoring policies for the prison 
cafeteria, or any failure to discipline his officers. There is no reason to think that, had an 
additional corrections officer been on duty, Keller would not have assaulted Ringgold. 
But we disagree with the court’s conclusion “that no reasonable trier of fact could 
find that Mari and Zosky used excessive force against” Ringgold. Id. at *4. A factfinder 
evaluating an excessive force claim must examine “several factors” to determine 
“whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or 
maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 649 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)). These factors include  
(1) “the need for the application of force”; (2) “the relationship between the 
need and the amount of force that was used”; (3) “the extent of injury 
inflicted”; (4) “the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as 
reasonably perceived by responsible officials on the basis of the facts 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. Summary 
judgment was granted by the Magistrate Judge, to whose jurisdiction all parties consented 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(c)(3) and 
1291 because the appeal ripened when Ringgold settled and withdrew his claims against 
Keller, and we therefore deny defendants’ motion to quash. See, e.g., DL Res., Inc. v. 
FirstEnergy Solutions Corp., 506 F.3d 209, 215-16 (3d Cir. 2007). “We review a district 
court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard the district court 
applied.” Viera v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 642 F.3d 407, 413 (3d Cir. 2011). Summary 
judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  
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known to them”; and (5) “any efforts made to temper the severity of a 
forceful response.”  
Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 
312, 321 (1986)). “Summary judgment in favor of a defendant is not appropriate if ‘it 
appears that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, will support 
a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain,’” id. (quoting Albers, 475 U.S. 
at 322), and such “wantonness exists when a prison guard intends to harm an inmate,” id. 
(citing Sampley v. Ruettgers, 704 F.2d 491, 495 (10th Cir. 1983)).  
Defendants submit that the security footage conclusively shows they did not use 
excessive force. “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is 
blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court 
should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). But we do not believe all parts of 
Ringgold’s version of events are “blatantly contradicted” by the footage.  
From the footage, we believe a jury could find Zosky and/or Mari used excessive 
force on Ringgold. The video appears to show Zosky looking towards Keller and 
Ringgold as Keller’s attack begins, so it is possible he would have known Keller was the 
aggressor. The video then shows Zosky run behind Ringgold and pull him down, and 
then Mari tackle Ringgold to the ground. The footage next appears to show Mari’s 
swinging his arm in what may have been a punch at Ringgold as Ringgold, Zosky, and 
Mari are piled together (with Keller pummeling Ringgold’s head). Ringgold testified at 
his deposition that he felt multiple officers punching, kicking, and kneeing him, and the 
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video does not categorically rule out the possibility that Mari and/or Zosky were doing 
just that.2 Accordingly, the extent of each officer’s participation is a factual dispute to be 
resolved by the jury. See Smith, 293 F.3d at 650. We express no opinion on the merits.  
But there is no dispute of material fact as to Stoner or Wright, and so we will 
affirm the court’s grant of summary judgment in their favor. As the court recognized, 
when Stoner “enters the picture . . . he grabs and pulls away Defendant Keller in order to 
prevent him from continuing to punch” Ringgold, 2014 WL 1317604, at *4. Although the 
camera then pans to the ceiling, Ringgold has adduced no evidence that Stoner was 
involved in the altercation beyond pulling Keller away. Similarly, nothing in the video 
shows that Wright was involved. Nor has Ringgold adduced any evidence that either 
Stoner or Wright stood by while he was beaten or otherwise encouraged the use of 
excessive force, cf., e.g., Smith, 293 F.3d at 649-51; Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 
1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988), or that either had failed to adequately train his subordinates or 
“respond to a pattern of past occurrences of injuries like” Ringgold’s, Ringgold, 2014 
WL 1317604, at *6 (citing Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 134 (3d Cir. 2001); 
Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989))—that is, any other basis, personal 
or supervisory, for liability for use of excessive force.  
                                              
2 We also note that the security camera pans upward for approximately 6 or 7 seconds 
during the altercation, only to refocus on the scuffle when Sergeant Stoner arrives on 
scene and the altercation has finished. The entire altercation appears to last approximately 
28 seconds from when Keller throws down his radio and punches Ringgold (about 11 
seconds after calling Ringgold out of line) to when the camera pans back down and 
refocuses on the parties.  
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Finally, we are aware of no accessory-after-the-fact theory of civil liability for use 
of excessive force, and Ringgold’s counsel did not direct us to one. Nor has Ringgold 
identified any evidentiary basis for a conspiracy claim.  
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment 
of the court and remand for further proceedings.   
